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DEDICATION 
ON GETTING IT RIGHT:                                     
REMEMBERING JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
GARY LAWSON* 
In the summer of 1985, when then-Judge Antonin Scalia’s three law clerks 
were finishing their term at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, we1 gave him a 
plaque emblazoned with the phrase, “It’s hard to get it right.” That was a 
phrase that Judge, and later Justice, Scalia’s law clerks heard often—never in 
anger, never in rebuke, but always as a reminder (often accompanied by a wry 
smile) that . . . well, sometimes it’s hard to get it right. 
Justice Scalia cared deeply and profoundly about getting it right. Law clerks 
learned early on about “the cart,” on which we had to put every source that we 
cited in a draft so that he could read the sources for himself to make sure that 
we characterized them correctly. The fact that he would usually delete 
whatever drafts we had given him and start over from scratch made that 
practice seem a tad puzzling at times, but he maintained that the drafts helped 
him. And it was certainly better for us to believe that than to believe the 
alternative. 
The most important part of the emblazoned aphorism on our plaque, though, 
was “it.” The “it” to which Judge/Justice Scalia so frequently referred was the 
law. 
Many legal questions are difficult, even if one does not fully endorse the 
“selection hypothesis” which posits that difficult cases are more likely to wind 
their way through the appellate system.2 Getting difficult cases right often 
 
* Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law. 
1 I was Judge Scalia’s fifth choice out of three for the position that year, but that is 
another story. 
2 See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).  The selection hypothesis may well be an accurate account of 
common law adjudication, but it does not describe large segments of public law 
adjudication.  From the standpoint of law (at least as that term was understood by Justice 
Scalia), a good number of the constitutional cases that reach the Supreme Court are 
preposterously easy and are made to look difficult only because they are typically decided 
on some basis other than constitutional meaning (or they both are and look preposterously 
easy because they are overturning some particularly absurd ruling of the Ninth Circuit).  It is 
absolutely not true that deciding cases based on personal policy preferences is always easy 
while deciding them based on law is always hard.  Often quite the opposite is true.  I 
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requires thought, research, more thought, a willingness to reconsider premises, 
careful consideration of the strongest arguments on all sides (including sides 
that one might not be personally inclined to take), multiple drafts to see what 
arguments work and don’t work, and long hours. All of that was necessary, 
Justice Scalia believed, because “close enough for government work” might be 
an apt aphorism for deferential review of agency decisions but was not 
appropriate for judicial law-finding. The law mattered. 
Of course, everyone in the legal culture—including people who find buried 
in the Constitution sweet mysteries of life that would evade detection even by 
Nicholas Cage, Diane Kruger, and Jon Voigt armed with lemon juice and hair 
dryers—says that getting “it” right matters to them. But Justice Scalia had a 
very concrete “it” in mind. For Justice Scalia, legal reasoning, at least in the 
public law world,3 was principally a deductive enterprise in which answers 
flowed from careful examination of authoritative sources external to the 
decisionmaker. Legal texts, he maintained, have objective meanings, and when 
the meanings of those texts are relevant to deciding a case, the judicial task is 
to ascertain those meanings as they would have been ascertained by an 
informed audience at the time of their promulgation. The pursuit of that 
common-sense understanding of communicative meaning—which I believe 
describes how virtually all legal academics generally expect their own work to 
be read (and generally expect judicial opinions of which they approve to be 
read)—has acquired the rarefied label of “originalist interpretation.” Some of 
us would not give it a rarefied label. We would call it “interpretation.” 
Justice Scalia’s forthright, persistent, and often witty articulation of an 
originalist methodology of textual interpretation is quite possibly the most 
important legal development of my lifetime. It is fair to say that before Justice 
Scalia, there was no serious and sustained intellectual engagement with this 
methodology. Some very important prior figures—most notably Raoul Berger 
and Robert Bork—made important observations about the intentions of 
historical persons and the consistency of modern judicial decisions with those 
expressed intentions, but Justice Scalia was the first prominent jurist to set 
forth a systematic methodology for understanding the content of legal texts by 
 
specifically recall one case from the Supreme Court (providing any specifics would, in my 
judgment, be a breach of confidentiality) in which the majority of the Court agonized 
endlessly over a case which was exceedingly difficult on policy grounds, whatever your 
policy preferences might have been, because the consequences of the practice in question 
were extraordinarily difficult to assess.  It was an easy case for Justice Scalia because, as a 
matter of law, it was completely obvious that the Constitution had nothing to say on the 
question one way or the other, which meant that the legislative judgment stood.  But many 
cases are genuinely hard on the law. 
3 The Supreme Court decides relatively few common-law cases in the strict sense of the 
term. To be sure, it is possible to describe, and perhaps quite accurately, much of the Court’s 
work product in common-law terms in a broader sense, see DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING 
CONSTITUTION (2010), but Justice Scalia roundly rejected that approach to public law 
adjudication. 
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reference to their original public communicative meanings. That was a 
revolutionary development. 
On June 14, 1986, shortly before he took a seat on the Supreme Court, then-
Judge Scalia gave a speech at the United States Department of Justice in which 
he laid out the theory of original meaning and recommended that self-
described originalists “change the label from the Doctrine of Original Intent to 
the Doctrine of Original Meaning.”4 Persons within the Reagan Administration 
were already starting to work out the idea of original meaning, but Judge 
Scalia’s articulation of the principles behind it was so clear and powerful that it 
shaped and energized the emerging originalist movement. The audience, which 
consisted of a rather spectacular collection of high-powered legal minds, knew 
that it had just witnessed something important. Indeed, even before the speech 
was finished, the Counselor to the Attorney General, T. Kenneth Cribb, taped a 
handwritten sign to the podium saying (if I recall it correctly): “Stipulated.” 
That speech was thus “a convenient marker of the formal ascendancy of the 
doctrine of original meaning in modern times.”5 
Three months later, Judge Scalia became Justice Scalia. His title changed, 
but “it” did not. Justice Scalia brought his methodology of original meaning to 
the Supreme Court, and the legal world has not since been the same. From a 
purely intellectual standpoint, of course, it should not matter whether ideas 
appear in blogs, law reviews, the Federal Reporter, or the United States 
Reports. Good ideas are good ideas, and bad ideas are bad ones. It is 
nonetheless a fact—a fact that should be shameful to an academy that is not, as 
it happens, always distinguished by its capacity for shame—that originalism 
was at best ignored or mocked, and at worst hissed (literally in law school 
classes, as some of us who attended law school in the pre-Scalia days can 
attest), until Justice Scalia espoused originalist ideas with unprecedented 
eloquence in a forum that had to be taken seriously by lawyers, and therefore 
by those persons who purported to be training lawyers. To see the effect of 
having a living, breathing, and undeniably intelligent originalist on the 
Supreme Court, run a Westlaw search of the law review database for the term 
“original meaning” before 1986 and see what turns up. 
To be sure, Justice Scalia was the first word rather than the last word on 
originalist interpretation. Indeed, I specifically disagree with some important 
features of Justice Scalia’s methodology, which I think sometimes confuses 
questions of meaning (which pertain to the act of interpretation) with very 
different questions of judicial role (which pertain to the act of adjudication). I 
have co-authored two articles specifically taking issue with Justice Scalia’s 
views on, respectively, the extent to which the Constitution must be read to 
 
4 Antonin Scalia, Speech Before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic 
Liberties (June 14, 1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, ORIGINAL MEANING: A SOURCEBOOK 
106 (U.S. Dept. of Justice 1987). 
5 Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 47, 48 n.10 (2006). 
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embody rules rather than standards6 and whether the Constitution allows 
Congress to remove Article III cases from the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.7 
None of that changes the fact that without Justice Scalia, I simply would not 
exist as a legal scholar. He not only inspired me to pursue an academic career, 
but I really cannot envision a world in which I could get a job as a law 
professor without Justice Scalia clearing the path. 
Those of us who pursue originalist projects are not standing on the shoulders 
of a giant. We are standing on the shoulders of Atlas. On February 13, 2016, 
the Earth shuddered a bit. 
 
 
6 See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 483 (2015). 
7 See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction 
Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1002 (2007). 
